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The effects of the Pension Fund Managers (PFMs) behavior on the foreign exchange 
market may be important, given the increasing size of their portfolio and their possible 
market power. Some authors argue that when big investors like PFMs trade large volumes 
in the foreign exchange market, they may influence other agents’ decisions, increasing the 
impact of the PFMs’ actions on the exchange rate. However, when PFMs have market 
power, they will take into account their influence on the exchange rate and will moderate 
their trading volume. Hence, there might be a mitigating effect that reduces the pressure on 
the exchange rate. This paper seeks to demonstrate the existence of this effect under 
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The intervention of local institutional investors, like PFMs, in the foreign exchange market 
could have effects on the exchange rate volatility, given the size and the market power of 
these agents. As noted by J.P Morgan (2002) the effect of these institutional investors on 
the foreign exchange market can be important, given the size of their portfolios. 
Additionally, some authors have argued that large shifts of the foreign currency holdings in 
the PFMs’ portfolios over a short span may destabilize the foreign exchange market and, 
hence, may justify limits on the size of the PFMs foreign investments or on the speed of 
such shifts (e.g. Zahler, 2005). Zahler states that the impact of PFMs on the foreign 
exchange market can be stronger due to the concentration of managers and the regulation 
on the rate of return of pension funds
1. According to this author, the investment decisions 
of PFMs are dominated by the short run expected returns, despite their long run aim. This 
behavior could exacerbate the pressures on the exchange rate, generating macroeconomic 
costs that can exceed the diversification benefits derived from holding assets in foreign 
currency.  
 
The fact that these large investors trade big volumes in the foreign exchange market may 
influence other agents’ decisions, increasing the impact of the PFMs on the exchange rate. 
However, this effect can be mitigated because agents with market power will consider the 
impact that their actions have on the exchange rate, on the value of their foreign currency 
transactions and on other agents’ actions. Therefore, PFMs with market power will take 
into account these effects, reducing the volume of their transactions and the pressure on the 
exchange rate. For the same reason, they will respond less to shocks on exchange rate 
expectations and on the interest rate differential than under perfect competition. Moreover, 
the equilibrium exchange rate under non-competitive structures will respond to exogenous 
shocks in the foreign currency net supply (e.g. exports changes, terms of trade, etc…), in 
contrast to the competitive case.   
 
The idea of this paper is to show the existence of this “mitigating effect” under different 
theoretical foreign exchange market structures. The results of the non-competitive 
structures will be contrasted with the benchmark case of perfect competition. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some microeconomic 
literature about the foreign exchange market. Section 3 analyses the behavior of PFMs and 
its impact on the exchange rate under different market structures. Section 4 concludes and 
summarizes the results of this paper.  
 
                                                 
1 This regulation can generate a “herd” effect.    3
2. Microeconomic literature on the foreign-exchange market  
 
 
In contrast to the traditional macroeconomic literature, the micro literature analyzes the 
behavior and interaction of individual agents in the foreign exchange market, taking into 
account the effects of asymmetric information and the agents’ heterogeneity. This literature 
refers then to “micro” aspects of the foreign-exchange market, such as the transmission of 
information among market agents, their behavior and the implications of the agents’ 
expectations heterogeneity on trading volume and exchange-rate volatility. Because this 
literature tries to understand the mechanisms that generate shifts in the exchange rate that 
are unexplained by movements in macroeconomic fundamentals, it focuses on the 
mechanics of foreign-exchange trading.  
 
Much of the early literature of the foreign-exchange market microstructure is concerned 
with the analysis of the process by which agents form expectations about the exchange-rate. 
By contrast with the simplifying assumption of rational expectations that underlies the 
traditional literature, the microstructure literature uses direct measures of expectations, like 
surveys of market participants. These foreign-exchange survey data studies suggest a strong 
heterogeneity and an increasing dispersion of expectations especially at longer forecast 
horizons. They also find a reversion in expectations, so that the direction of the long-run 
expectations differs from the direction of the short-run expectations
2. Additionally, Froot 
and Ito (1989) find an overreaction of the short-term expectations with respect to the long-
term expectations when the exchange rate changes.  
 
This literature suggests that the discrepancy between expectations at different horizons may 
be explained by the use of different forecasting techniques in the short and in the long run.  
The “chartist” or “technical” analysis, which identifies broad ranges within which exchange 
rates are expected to move by using trends, graphic patterns and descriptive statistics, is the 
predominant technique used for short-run forecasting. In contrast, fundamental analysis and 
conventional exchange rate models are used for long-run exchange rate forecasting
3. The 
fact that standard exchange rate models have poor performance and that chartist techniques 
are used by many foreign-exchange practitioners to predict the exchange rate at short-run 
horizons suggests that non-fundamentals factors could dominate the short-run movements 
of the exchange rate. Insofar as this short-run behavior is generalized, the foreign-exchange 
                                                 
2 This means that expectations of additional depreciations in the short run follow an observed depreciation 
while it is followed by expectations of a moderate appreciation in the long run.   
3 Taylor and Allen (1992) suggest a broad consensus of the participants in the London foreign exchange 
market with respect to the importance given to the chartist analysis. They find that almost 90% of the 
respondents use some chartist technique when they form their short run exchange rate expectations (intraday 
to one week) and 60% of the respondents regard charts at least as important as fundamentals. Moreover, the 
importance given to economic fundamentals increases for longer horizons (from one month to one year). 
Cheung and Wong (2000) find that the majority of respondents in the foreign-exchange markets of Hong-
Kong, Tokyo and Singapore recognizes the existence of significant effects of non-fundamentals factors on 
short-run exchange-rates expectations. Lui & Mole (1998) report dealers in Hong-Kong have a skew toward 
technical analysis at short horizons and toward fundamental analysis at longer horizons.   4
market can be prone to speculative movements following unexpected deviations of the 
exchange rate with respect to the economic fundamentals
4. 
 
Many studies in the microstructure literature have found a strong contemporaneous 
correlation between trading volume and the exchange rate volatility (see Sarno and Taylor 
(2001) for a survey of this literature). In the context of portfolio choice models (Lyons, 
1991), the trading volume is mainly explained by differences in valuations, which can be 
due to different expectations or because the volume of transactions themselves may 
influence valuations over time. In this context, if large volumes of foreign currency are 
traded due to non-fundamental reasons (speculative behavior), the movements of the 
exchange rate can be very important. This is especially the case when the transactions of 
agents with market power can influence the expectations and the valuations of other agents 
and their trading volume, generating a stronger impact on the exchange rate. 
 
Although the market power of some agents in the foreign exchange market can be very 
important to explain changes in the trading volume and in the exchange rate, the micro 
literature has not focused on non-competitive practices in the international foreign 
exchange markets
5. It is difficult to think of non-competitive behavior when there are a 
large number of participants in the market and the transmission of information is fast. 
However, non-competitive behavior can exist in small domestic foreign exchange markets
6, 
since the agents’ portfolio size may affect the market through the trading volume and its 
impact on the expectations of other agents.  
 
This paper goes in this direction and tries to explain the consequences of non-competitive 
market structures on the exchange rate. Specifically we will demonstrate the existence of an 
effect of market power that moderates the impact of agents’ decisions on the exchange rate, 
which we call the mitigating effect. If agents with market power consider the effects that 
their actions have on others’ valuations and on the exchange rate, then they will moderate 
their trading volume, mitigating the pressure on the exchange rate and making the foreign 
exchange market less prone to speculative movements.  
                                                 
4 A number of researchers have constructed different models, in the vein of Frankel and Froot (1987), to show 
the role of non-fundamentalist traders in the generation of bubbles in the foreign-exchange market.  
5 These are the markets for currencies with international demand like dollars or euros.  
6 These are markets for currencies like the Colombian peso, which are not internationally demanded.    5




In this section different structures of the foreign exchange market will be modeled to show 
the consequences on the exchange rate of the PFMs market power and the existence of the 
mitigating effect. First, we are going to present the benchmark case where perfect 
competition is assumed. Then, a simple model of monopsony will be introduced to see the 
effect of a big PFM on the exchange rate. After that, an oligopsony à la Cournot will be 
analyzed in order to identify the effects of N  PFMs with market power. Finally, an 
oligopsony à la Stackelberg with one PFM as a leader and 1 N −  PFMs as followers will be 
analyzed. The results of each one of these structures will be compared with respect to the 
benchmark case, in which there are not market power effects.  
 
 
3.1. Perfect Competition 
 
 
In this setting all the agents share the same exchange rate expectations and PFMs take 
prices as given. In this case, the size of agents’ portfolios does not matter and all react in 
the same way with respect to changes in the interest rates and other variables.  
 
The optimal decision of a risk neutral PFM is to choose his portfolio composition between 
assets in domestic currency l and foreign currency assets x, in order to maximize his 
portfolio expected return (in local currency
7) given a portfolio initial composition ( 0 l  and 
0 x ) and a fixed amount to invest m
8. Thus, the manager reallocates his portfolio given the 
observed exchange rate,e, the domestic and foreign interest rates (i and 
* i , respectively) 
and the exchange rate expectation, 
e e , which is the same for everybody. 
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The reduced form of this problem is:  
 




x Max l x e xe i xe i  +− + + +   
 
                                                 
7 This is important because the pensions are given in local currency.  
8 It is assumed that the portfolio size of the PFMs does not change.    6
The interior solution of this problem ( 0, 0 xl >> ) is given by the interest rate parity 













   ( (1 1) ) 
 
It corresponds to the equilibrium exchange rate under perfect competition ( pc e ), at which 
the typical PFM demands an amountxof foreign currency and his net purchase of this asset 
is 0 x x − . For all PFMs the net demand of foreign currency corresponds to the sum of the 
individual net purchases 0 X X − . 
 
We are assuming that there are two types of agents in the foreign exchange market: PFMs 
who demand foreign currency and other agents like exporters who supply foreign currency. 
The behavior of the other agents in the market is modeled by a foreign currency net supply 
function  () , Qez, where Q is the amount of foreign currency supplied, e is the exchange 
rate and z  corresponds to exogenous variables that affect the net supply of foreign 
currency (e.g. exports changes, terms of trade, etc…). This function can be written as 


















  ( (2 2) ) 
 
To simplify and because  0 X  is given, the foreign currency net supply can be written as 
( ) , ee X z = , if at each price the supplied amount is equal to the demanded amount, where 






 is a positive constant. 
G Gr ra ap ph h   1 1. .   
 
 
pc e  
X
* X Q =
e ( ) , eQz  7
R Re es su ul lt t    1 1: :  In the perfect competition equilibrium, the exchange rate is defined by the 
interest rate parity condition (1) and the amount of foreign currency traded given by 
equation (2).  
   
   
R Re es su ul lt t   2 2: :  The equilibrium exchange rate under perfect competition, pc e , is determined only 











, and the exchange rate expectations,
e e ,  
(equation (1)). This implies that any change in these variables affects proportionally the 









R Re es su ul lt t   3 3: :  The equilibrium exchange rate under perfect competition does not react to an 
exogenous shock in the foreign currency net supply (equation (1)), therefore:  0
pc de
dz
= .  
 
This result implies that when there is an exogenous shock on the foreign currency net 
supply (e.g. exports changes, terms of trade, etc…), PFMs absorb completely the additional 
supply until the interest rate parity condition is reestablished (Graph 2).    
   
G Gr ra ap ph h   2 2. .   
   
 
 










Under this structure there is only one PFM who faces the total net supply of foreign 
currency; then the total net demand of this asset ( 0 X X − ) is exclusively his decision. As a 
result, this agent knows that any change in his trading volume has an impact on the 
exchange rate and hence on the valuation of his net purchases.  
 
Thus, the PFM with monopsony power takes into account the effect of his transactions on 
the exchange rate, so that his optimization problem is:  
 




X Max L X e X z Xe X z i Xe i  +− + + +     
 
and, from the first order condition, the equilibrium exchange rate under monopsony is 
 
( ) 0 mp c eea XX =+ −   ( (3 3) )   
   
 








, the equilibrium exchange rate under monopsony is lower 
than in perfect competition when the monopsonist has a positive net demand of foreign 
currency () 0 0 XX −< . 
 
Intuitively, when the optimal decision of the monopsonist is to buy foreign currency, he 
knows that the additional purchase of a unit of foreign currency will increase the exchange 
rate and hence the cost of his purchases. For this reason, the monopsonist reduces his 
demand and the equilibrium exchange rate will be less depreciated than in the perfect 
competition case (this is the “mitigating” effect).  
 
By the same token, when the monopsonist finds it optimal to sell foreign currency 
(() 0 0 XX −> ), he knows that selling an additional unit of this asset reduces the exchange 
rate and thus the value of his total sales. To avoid this adverse effect on his sales, the 
monopsonist reduces his foreign currency supply and the exchange rate will be more 
depreciated than in perfect competition. 
 
 
R Re es su ul lt t   5 5: :  The response of the monopsony equilibrium exchange rate,  m e , to shocks to  the 
interest rate differential or to the exchange rate expectations is half the response of the 








=          ( (4 4) )     9
 
(see Mathematical Appendix for a proof). 
 
This follows because the monopsonist responds less to these shocks than in perfect 
competition given that he takes into account the impact of his transactions on the exchange 
rate and on the value of his total purchases or sales (the “mitigating” effect).   
   
   
R Re es su ul lt t   6 6: :   An exogenous shock to the foreign currency net supply has a negative impact on 
the monopsony equilibrium exchange rate: 
 







   ( (5 5) )   
     
(see Mathematical Appendix for a proof).  
In contrast to the perfect competition case where  0
pc de
dz
= , under monopsony the exchange 
rate reacts to exogenous shocks to the net supply of foreign currency. Intuitively, when 
there is an exogenous shock, the monopsonist does not absorb all the excess supply because 
he considers the effect of his purchases on the exchange rate. Thus, the shock is not 
completely absorbed by the trading volume and the equilibrium exchange rate will adjust to 
a new equilibrium.  
 
For example, if there is an exogenous increase in exports (or terms of trade) the foreign 
currency supply will rise by more than the demand of the monopsonist, and there will be an 
excess of supply that appreciates the exchange rate. The new equilibrium exchange rate will 




3.3. Cournot Oligopsony 
 
 
In this case the market structure is characterized by N  pension fund managers who act 
simultaneously and take the value of the others’ net purchases as given. The optimization 
problem for a PFM  j  is as follows: 
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e




Ma xl xeXz x eXz i x e i
st X x
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 +− + + + 
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   10
The optimization condition is now:  
 
( ) 0 cp c j jj ee a x x =+ −   ( (6 6) )   
 
 















   
R Re es su ul lt t    7 7: :  As in the monopsony case, the equilibrium exchange rate under a Cournot 
oligopsony structure is lower than in perfect competition when PFMs have a positive net 
demand for foreign currency, () 0 0 jj xx − < .  
 
As before, this result is explained by the existence of market power. Agents with market 
power consider the effect of their transactions on the exchange rate and thus on the value of 
their purchases (or sales), inducing them to reduce their trading volume and moderating the 
impact on the exchange rate. This is again the mitigating effect of market power. 
 
The effects of generalized or specific changes in expectations can be analyzed under 
different specifications of the model, depending on whether there is convergence or 
divergence of expectations.  
 
 
R Re es su ul lt t   8 8: :      If expectations converge (
 
  pcj pch pc eeeh j = =∀ ≠ ), the impact of a generalized 
shock to expectations or to the interest rate differential on the equilibrium exchange rate is 
smaller in oligopsony than in perfect competition:  








   ( (7 7) )   
 









 for  1 N > , the effect of a generalized shock to 
expectations on the oligopsony equilibrium exchange rate is greater than in monopsony. 
(see Mathematical Appendix for a proof).  
 
As PFMs with market power know that any change in their demand for foreign currency 
has an adverse effect on the value of their purchases (or sales), they respond less to these 
shocks than when this effect is not realized (e.g. under perfect competition). However, the 
impact on the exchange rate is greater than in monopsony because more, smaller 
individuals are reacting simultaneously to a generalized shock to expectations (or to the 
interest rate differential), taking the actions of others as given. Hence, the sum of the   11
changes in the quantities traded by all the Cournot competitors is larger than the change in 
the quantity traded by the monopsonist in the face of the same shock. 
 
   
R Re es su ul lt t   9 9: :      If expectations differ among PFMs (   pcj pch eeh j ≠ ∀≠ ), the impact of a shock 
to the expectations of only one PFM on the equilibrium exchange rate is lower than the 























, the effect of a change in the expectations of one agent 
on the equilibrium exchange rate under Cournot competition is less than the effect in 
monopsony (see Mathematical Appendix).  
 
This result implies that when there is a shock to the expectations of only one individual, the 
impact on the Cournot equilibrium exchange rate will be less than in the case where all 
PFMs are hit simultaneously by the same shock. At the same time, the equilibrium 
exchange rate will respond more to changes in the monopsonist’s expectations than to 




R Re es su ul lt t   1 10 0: :      As in monopsony, an exogenous shock on the foreign currency net supply has a 
negative impact on the Cournot equilibrium exchange rate: 
 
()







   ( (5 5) )   
     
However, since 1 N > , more individuals can absorb the excess supply, so that the 
equilibrium exchange rate has to adjust less than in the monopsony case.  
 
 
3.4. Stackelberg Oligopsony 
 
 
In this structure, there are N  pension fund managers with market power, but now one of 
them acts as a leader and the others  1 N −  act as followers. This is a sequential game in 
which the leader moves first and then the followers observe the leader’s action and take it 
                                                 
9 Although the demand of the agent with changing expectations will vary more than the monopsonist’s 
demand, the other agents will react inversely to the change of the demand of this agent. Thus the reaction of 
the monopsonist’s demand is greater than the change in the total demand of all the Cournot competitors.   12
into account to make their decisions. At the same time, the leader considers the reaction of 
the followers in his optimal decision. 
 
In this setting, there are two effects of the leader’s transaction: a direct effect that affects 
only the trading volume of the followers and an indirect effect that influences the followers’ 
expectations. In the first case, the followers will react inversely to a change in the leaders’ 
trading volume, while in the second case the change in the followers’ demand (or supply) is 
in the same direction as the leader’s movement.  
 
The analysis of this sequential game begins by the followers’ decision, which is the same as 
the decision of a Cournot competitor. The maximization problem of a typical follower is 
then:  
 
() ( ) ( ) ( )()
*
00 ,, 1 1
. .    
f
e
ff f f f L x
Lf
fL
Max l x e X z x e X z i x e x i
st X x x
≠




where the followers’ expectation may depend on the leader’s transaction  ()
ee
f fL ee x = , if 
there exist the above mentioned indirect effect. If not, 
e
f e  is exogenous. 
 
 
The first order condition implies that:  
 
( ) ( ) 0 Sp c f L ff eex a x x =+ −    ( (9 9) ) 
 
In general: 
















Now the leader’s maximization problem is given by:   
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The equilibrium exchange rate in the Stackelberg oligopsony follows from equations (9) 
and (10).  
   
  
R Re es su ul lt t   1 11 1: :      If only the direct effect of the leaders’ transaction is taken into account (
e
f e  is 
exogenous) the impact of a generalized shock to expectations 
(
  
  pcj pch pcL pc eeeeh j L === ∀ ≠ ≠ ) on the Stackelberg equilibrium exchange rate is 









=    ( (1 11 1) ) 
 
 
This confirms the existence of a mitigating effect of market power on the equilibrium 
exchange rate (see Mathematical Appendix for a proof).  
 
However, this impact is higher than in the monopsony and Cournot equilibria. Although the 
leader’s reaction to a generalized shock to expectations is similar to the monopsonist’s, the 
convergence of expectations implies that the followers will react in the same way as the 
leader (demand more foreign currency in the face of increased expectations of 
depreciation). This higher demand implies that the exchange rate will change more than in 
monopsony. In contrast to the Cournot player, who takes the others’ demand as given, the 
Stackelberg leader knows that any increase in his demand will reduce the demand of the 
followers (direct effect). However, he also knows that this decreasing in the followers’ 
demand is partially offset by the generalized expectations of depreciation. Hence, the leader 
will demand more than the Cournot competitor, followers will demand less, but the effect 
of the former will be stronger. The total demand will be higher than under Cournot and thus 
the equilibrium exchange rate.  
 
   14
R Re es su ul lt t   1 12 2: :      When only the direct effect is taken into account (
e
f e  is exogenous), the impact 
of a specific shock to the leader’s expectations (   pcj pch pcL eeeh j L ≠ ≠∀ ≠ ≠ ) on the 








=    ( (1 12 2) ) 
 
This can be verified by comparing equations (11) and (12). If only the leader experiences 





R Re es su ul lt t   1 13 3: :    When both the direct and the indirect effects are considered ( ()
ee
f fL ee x = ), the 
impact of a shock to the leader’s expectations on the equilibrium exchange rate is the same 
as in the case where only the direct effect is assumed (
e
f e  is exogenous) and expectations 
diverge (   pcj pch pcL eeeh j L ≠≠∀ ≠ ≠ ): 







=    ( (1 13 3) ) 
 
In this case, the leader considers the effect that his transaction has on the followers’ 
expectations. An increase in the leader’s expectations of depreciation induces a rise in his 
demand for foreign currency. This, in turn produces higher followers’ expectations of 
depreciation and an expansion of their demand for foreign currency. This reaction of the 
followers implies an additional upward pressure on the exchange rate. Thus, in order to 
avoid this adverse effect on the cost of his purchases, the leader will moderate the increase 
in his demand. This implies that the mitigating effect of market power is stronger since the 
leader not only tries to alleviate the direct impact of his additional demand on the market, 
but also has to offset the effect of his actions on the followers’ expectations.  
 
   
R Re es su ul lt t   1 14 4: :    The impact of an exogenous shock to the foreign currency net supply on the 
Stackelberg equilibrium exchange rate is negative and less than the impact under 
monopsony. 
 
When only the direct effect is considered we have: 
 







     ( (1 14 4) ) 
 
                                                 
10 This contrasts with the case of converging expectations, where a shift in the latter is generalized and 
induces a change in the demand for foreign currency of all the agents.    15












   ( (1 15 5) ) 
 
 
This result follows from comparing equations (14) and (15) with equation (5). Intuitively, 
as in the cases of monopsony and Cournot competition, an exogenous change in the foreign 
currency net supply is not totally absorbed by PFMs because of the mitigating effect.  
 
In sum, the equilibrium results under the different market structures are shown in table 1. 
The existence of the mitigating effect of market power can be seen by comparing the 
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If expectations converge 
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Cournot  ( ) 0 cp c j jj ee a x x =+ −
  If expectations diverge 





















If expectations converge 
  













If expectations diverge 




















































































 is a positive constant. 
N is the number of pension fund managers in the market.  
z  corresponds to exogenous variables that affect the net supply of foreign currency (e.g. exports, terms of trade, etc…). 
* The direct effect refers to the impact of the leader’s transaction on the trading volume of the followers, so that 
e
f e is exogenous. 
** The indirect effect refers to the influence of the leaders’ transaction on the followers’ expectations ( ( )
ee
f fL ee x = ).  17
4. Conclusions   
 
 
The concern about the destabilizing effect of PFMs on the foreign exchange market (given 
the increasing size of their portfolios) can be alleviated by the existence of a mitigating 
effect of market power. This effect implies that PFMs with market power will consider the 
impact that their actions have on the exchange rate, on the value of their foreign currency 
transactions and on other agents’ decisions. For this reason, PFMs will moderate the 
volume of their transactions and, therefore, the pressure on the exchange rate.    
 
Although the investment decisions of PFMs can be dominated by the short run expected 
returns (as suggested by Zahler, 2005), and given that non-fundamentals factors could 
dominate the short-run movements of the exchange rate (as the evidence suggests), the fact 
that market power has a mitigating effect on the exchange rate can make the foreign-
exchange market less prone to speculative movements. Therefore, the argument that large 
shifts of the foreign currency holdings in the PFMs’ portfolios over a short span may 
destabilize the foreign exchange market is weakened when there is market power.  
 
This paper shows that, due to the mitigating effect, PFMs with market power will respond 
less to shocks to exchange rate expectations (or to the interest rate differential) than under 
perfect competition. Furthermore, in contrast to the competitive case, the equilibrium 
exchange rate will respond to exogenous shocks to the foreign currency net supply (e.g. 
exports changes, terms of trade, etc…). In perfect competition PFMs absorb completely the 
additional supply until the interest rate parity condition is reestablished. However, when 
PFMs have market power, the excess supply generated by an exogenous shock is not 
completely absorbed by the PFMs, because they consider the effect of their purchases on 
the exchange rate.    18
5. Mathematical Appendix 
 
 
5.1. The monopsony case 
 
 
The monopsonist PFM’s optimization problem is:  
 




X Max L X e X z Xe X z i Xe i  +− + + +     
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  ( (A A. .1 1) )   
   
  
which implies that:   ( )
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, and from here we have:  
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The impact of a change in the exogenous variables on the monopsony equilibrium 
exchange rate is given by:  
 







   ( (A A. .2 2) )   
 
 
And the effect on the equilibrium exchange rate under monopsony of a shock to the interest 












5.2. The Cournot oligopsony case 
 
 
The optimization problem for the PFM  j , who takes as given the foreign currency demand 
of other PFMs (   h x hj ∀≠ ), is as follows: 
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  ( (A A. .4 4) )   
 
 















From (A.4) the impact of an exogenous change in the foreign currency net supply on the 
equilibrium exchange rate is given by:  
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   ( (A A. .5 5) )     20
 
The effects of generalized or specific changes in expectations can be analyzed under 
different specifications of the model, depending on whether there is convergence or 
divergence of expectations.  
 
 
5.2.1. Expectations convergence  
 
In this case there is not difference in expectations, then: 
 
  pcj pch pc eeeh j = =∀ ≠ . 

















   ( (A A. .6 6) )   
 
 
So that the impact of a generalized shock to expectations (or to the interest rate differential) 













5.2.2. Expectations divergence  
 
Consider now that expectations differ among PFMs, it means that    pcj pch eeh j ≠∀ ≠ . 









     ( (A A. .8 8) )   
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     ( (A A. .9 9) )   21
 
5.3. The Stackelberg oligopsony case 
 
 
The maximization problem of a typical follower is:  
 
() ( ) ( ) ( )()
*
00 ,, 1 1
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Max l x e X z x e X z i x e x i
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and the first order condition implies that:  
 
( ) ( ) 0 Sp c f L ff eex a x x =+ −    ( (A A. .1 10 0) ) 
 












 which indicates that the followers’ expectations 
e
f e  may 








From this equation the effect of a change in the leader’s transaction on the demand of a 
typical follower is given by:  
 
11 fp c f
LL
dx de
dx aN dx N
=−      ( (A A. .1 11 1) ) 
 
 
This followers’ reaction is taken into account by the leader’s maximization problem, so 
that:   
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f LfL ex e x α =+      ( (A A. .1 13 3) ) 
 
such that  ( ) 0
e











 is the interest rate differential. 
 
 
Because there are two possible effects of the leader’s transaction on the followers’ reaction, 
the different shocks are analyzed under these two scenarios.   
 
 
5.3.1.  Direct effect 
 
In this case the transaction of the leader ( L x ) does not affect the expectations of the 
followers 
e
f e , which means that  0 α =  and  0
ee
f f ee = . Hence, the leader’s transaction affects 


















     ( (A A. .1 14 4) ) 
 





= −       ( (A A. .1 15 5) ) 
 
   








=+      ( (A A. .1 16 6) ) 
 
 
From these results the impact of an exogenous change in the foreign currency net supply on 
the equilibrium exchange rate is given by:  
 







   ( (A A. .1 17 7) )   
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5.3.1.1.  Expectations convergence 
 
The impact of a generalized shock to expectations (or to the interest rate differential) is 
analyzed under the assumption of convergence in expectations 
(
  
  pcj pch pcL pc eeeeh j L === ∀ ≠ ≠ ). 
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     ( (A A. .1 19 9) ) 
 






























5.3.1.2. Expectations divergence 
 
The effect of a shock only to the leader’s expectations is analyzed in the case when 
expectations differ (   pcj pch pcL eeeh j L ≠≠∀ ≠ ≠ ). In this case, the comparative statics 
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Thus the effect of a shock only to the leader’s expectations on the Stackelberg equilibrium 












5.3.2.   Direct and indirect effects 
 
Additional to the direct effect we consider an indirect effect of the leader’s transaction that 
affects the expectations of the followers, then  0 α >  and  ( ) 0
e
pcf i f L ed e x α =+  . This 
indirect effect leads to an additional change in the followers’ demand for foreign currency 








α =    ( (A A. .2 24 4) ) 
 








α =−    ( (A A. .2 25 5) ) 
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   ( (A A. .2 26 6) )   
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From here and from the first order condition of the followers’ maximization problem 
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=      ( (A A. .2 29 9) )   
 
 
and the impact of an exogenous shock to the foreign currency net supply on the equilibrium 









dz z Na d N α
 ∂
= 
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  ( (A A. .3 30 0) )   
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